Chinese Companies controls one third of African Ports
Africa’s ports are at the heart of revenue generation and resilience. They also shape the logistics of warfare. Chinese companies are shifting from constructing to financing and operating ports in Africa, and governments need to think like strategists, not planners. A mapping study by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimates that Chinese state-owned companies have a stake in 78 of Africa’s 231 commercial ports in 32 countries.
West Africa accounts for 35 of these engagements, East Africa for 17, Southern Africa for 15 and North Africa for 11. By contrast, there are 10 ports built or operated by China in Latin America and the Caribbean and 24 in Asia. This footprint can improve the efficiency of trade. But Chinese companies can also influence access, data, and crisis decisions at African ports.
What does the term “STAKE” mean?
A “stake” can be one of three different things: building, financing, or operating. It can take the first two and remain in control. However, the third, operations, often decides who moves, when, and at what price. The Africa Center report cites examples of Chinese companies controlling the entire value chain—financing, construction, operations, and shareholding. It also shows how CCCC can obtain the main contract and then subcontract to CHEC. That structure is important. It can lock in kit standards, software choices, and vendor dependence for decades.
Why Operations Matter
Berths are assigned, queues controlled, and crane priority is determined by operators. They also control key process data in terminal systems. This scenario also raises questions about data sovereignty and strategic dependence. Choices can become a critical security lever in a crisis. A study by the Africa Center estimates China earns as much as $13 in trade revenue for every $1 it invests in ports.
It also highlights Chinese companies with operating lease rights for 10 African ports. However, for many African ports, there is a real performance gap. Delays and poor management can add as much as 50% to the cost of handling compared to global rates, the report estimates. So governments tend to balance the risks of control against a strong desire for efficiency.
Lekki: How Influence Compounds
A prime example is Nigeria’s Lekki Deep Sea Port, where one player touches finance, construction, equity, and operations, and influence grows. The Africa Center report said CHEC was the construction and engineering leader, secured loan financing from China Development Bank, and took a 54% financial stake in the port.
It also runs the port on a 16-year lease. In parallel, the terminal arm of CMA CGM operates the container terminal under a sub-concession scheme. The conclusion is simple: Equity is not always control, but a lease plus systems and finance can still deliver leverage.
Beijing’s Planning Signals
Chinese port choices generally fit national planning. In its 2021-2025 Five-Year Plan, China mentions a “connectivity framework of six corridors, six routes, and multiple countries and ports” for Belt and Road construction. There are three corridors passing through Africa, entering Kenya/Tanzania, Egypt/Suez, and Tunisia.
That same Africa Center report ties those locations to “overseas strategic strongpoints” and to “civil-military fusion” standards—civilian shipping and cargo can also be used for military purposes. That doesn’t mean all ports will be “dual-use.” However, it does explain the potential for lines to blur by design.
Djibouti’s Dual-Use Model
Djibouti is the most obvious example of convergence between a commercial port and a military base. Two months after the main port opened in 2017, China broadened the development of Doraleh to include a naval facility, making it China’s first known military base outside its home territory, the Africa Center report said.
The Council on Foreign Relations analysis also notes the coincidence of the port opening and the base’s completion. Strategists are now asking which ports possess the infrastructure and political conditions required for a similar support facility.
Dual-Use: Practical Signs
The engineering is measurable. A sustained naval support site usually needs:
- Deep water and long berths
- Heavy cranes and secure yards
- Fuel storage and replenishment access
- The facility features controlled perimeters, a stable power supply, and resilient communication systems.
Many commercial ports can host a visit. Fewer can sustain a task group. So, track changes in berth length, fuel farms, and access controls—not just ownership headlines.
PLA Port Access Since 2000
The Africa Center study ties port footprint to military activity. It mentions some of the ports used by China to host PLA Navy port calls or be staging areas for PLA exercises, such as Dar es Salaam, Lagos, Durban, and Doraleh. It also includes Chinese-built facilities used for the drills, such as Tanzania’s Kigamboni Naval Base, Mapinga training center, and Ngerengere Air Force Base, and Ethiopia’s Awash Arba War Technical School.
Most significantly, the report details 55 port calls by the PLA and 19 bilateral and multilateral exercises in Africa since 2000. That history suggests China tests access, not once but repeatedly. It also indicates that some ports have already shown a basic acceptance of Chinese naval visits.
Abu Qir: Quiet Access via Contracts
b. Hutchison Ports has a 38-year lease from the Egyptian Navy to operate a terminal at the Abu Qir Naval Base, according to a report by the Africa Center. Trade reporting and Hutchison’s own project documents also show a 38-year concession for the terminal inside the base. What is important about this model is its inclusion of a commercial operator inside a military perimeter. This sort of arrangement can form ties between trade infrastructure and naval logistics.
Where Basing Risk Clusters
Equity thresholds tend to attract more attention from analysts. Meanwhile, a report from the Africa Center warns that share size is not a definitive indicator, citing Doraleh, which has 23% Chinese stakes in the port development. But high equity could reduce the friction. The same study estimates that Chinese companies now own 50% or more of West African ports, including Kribi (66%), Lomé (50%), and Lekki (around 52-54%).
Another filter is whether PLA was engaged or not. Of 78 ports with known Chinese activity, 36 have hosted PLA port calls or exercises. The report also includes political criteria: location, party-to-party relations, investment exposure, and public opinion. Engineering defines the limits; politics chooses the direction.
Conclusion
Chinese companies working in African ports must balance business and security. Chinese companies could actually seize control of chokepoints in African ports. The data is clear: there are 78 ports across 32 countries and a long history of PLA port access activity dating back to 2000.
These developments offer no guarantees. African states can modernize their ports without compromising their sovereignty. Meanwhile, they need to treat ports as strategic assets, write enforceable leases, and build real oversight capacity. When they do, they operate more efficiently while maintaining control.
References
- https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Mapping-Chinas-Port-Development.pdf
- https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-strategy-djibouti-mixing-commercial-and-military-interests
- https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/terminals/hutchison-ports-inks-agreement-with-egyptian-navy-for-730m-container-terminal
- https://www.hutchisonportsabuqir.com/about-us/
- https://www.csis.org/analysis/responding-chinas-growing-influence-ports-global-south
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