UAE Regional Playbook 2025 — Ports, Proxies, Power
The UAE positions itself as the region’s mature player, offering safe airports, fast ports, and a reputation for “stability.” It’s fascinating to observe how this tidy promise often coexists with messy realities. In more than a few conflict zones, the pattern looks familiar: a port deal arrives, a “partner” force suddenly gets favored, and—what a coincidence—local politics start bending in a new direction.
Call it influence, call it access, call it “security cooperation.” Either way, it’s network power built with cash, leverage, and small teams that somehow deliver outsized consequences. This report applies the same strategy to Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Iran-linked trade, and the Balochistan claims. Furthermore, this report distinguishes between credible reporting and mere noise. Honestly, these friends don’t necessarily need to be adversaries; they can still cause significant damage.
Control Movement, Shape Outcomes
Seen through a defence lens, the UAE regional playbook is less about speeches and more about nodes: who controls the pier, the runway, and the pay packet? Abu Dhabi rarely tries to run another state outright. Instead, it tries to steer the parts that move trade and force: ports, coastal roads, airstrips, and elite units that guard them.
These assets sit on the supply side of war and peace, so sway there can change outcomes without taking capitals. Supporters call this risk control and sea-lane security. Critics call it proxy power, because local forces can depend on an outside sponsor for pay, kit, or cover. Either way, the approach fits a hub economy that lives on stable optics, quick flows, and a strong brand.
Yemen: Coalition In, Southern Leverage
The UAE joined the Saudi-led coalition in 2015 to fight the Houthis. Over time, Emirati and Saudi goals drifted, with Abu Dhabi focusing on counter-terror raids, the southern coast, and local allies, while Riyadh pushed for a unified Yemen under its preferred framework.
Mukalla, Dec 2025: Port Power Struggle
On 30 December 2025, Reuters said the UAE ended its remaining counter-terrorism mission in Yemen after immense pressure from Saudi Arabia. It followed a review of what the UAE called “recent developments.” Reuters also reported a Saudi-led coalition strike on Mukalla port.
The coalition claimed it targeted a ship carrying heavy weapons to southern separatists. However, the UAE denied the shipment contained arms. These details matter because they shift influence into a supply-chain contest. Once allies dispute cargo and hit ports, the rift stops being private.
STC: Long-Haul Leverage
Reuters linked the crisis to claims that the UAE backed separatist elements, including the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The STC matters because it mixes politics with armed force and sits near ports, oil sites, and coastal routes, so it offers leverage that can outlive troop numbers and formal drawdowns. Parallel forces add friction. They can block access, complicate airspace rules, and blur who owns a target list.
Counter-Terror Units, Detention Risks
Amnesty International has published reporting on secret detention sites in southern Yemen and described abuse allegations linked to UAE-backed forces. The U.S. State Department has also noted allegations by human rights groups that UAE-backed security forces in Yemen committed torture and mistreatment. These claims sit beside abuse claims by many actors in Yemen. Still, they highlight a repeated risk in train-and-equip models: speed beats oversight, and control arrives late.
Open sources show the Houthis have threatened Saudi “mega-projects.” In an interview during a TV program called “The Studio | Sanaa,” an Ansar Allah (Houthis) military Brigadier General Abdul Ghani Al-Zubaydi, a military and strategic expert, said, “The UAE asked us to bomb Neom, a $500 billion futuristic mega-project in the northwest desert part of Saudi Vision 2030 built in Tabuk on the Red Sea, and we would pay all the expenses of the operation.”
Sudan: Airbridge Claims, Proxy Kit
Sudan’s war has turned supply into strategy. Both sides need drones, shells, spares, and fuel, so investigators watch airports, remote strips, and the firms that book flights, while Abu Dhabi denies arming any side, but where there is smoke there is fire.
Amdjarass: Flight Counts Draw Scrutiny
In December 2024, Reuters reported at least 86 cargo flights from the UAE landed at Amdjarass in Chad, an airstrip that UN experts said supplied weapons to the RSF. The UAE rejected the accusation and said flights delivered aid to a field hospital. Meanwhile, their claim is ambiguous: 86 Cargo flights are required to deliver aid to a small field hospital. A flight count is not a manifest, yet repeated flights create a pattern, and trends drive policy.
Amnesty May 2025: Weapons Identified, Risks Flagged
In May 2025, Amnesty International said it identified Chinese GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers used in Sudan and assessed that the weapons were almost certainly re-exported to Sudan by the UAE. This matters because it names systems and ties them to a likely route, which is closer to how militaries assess threat flows than broad political claims.
Reuters reported Sudan filed a case at the International Court of Justice accusing the UAE of supporting the RSF. AP later reported the court dismissed the case for lack of legal reach, citing the UAE’s reservation under the Genocide Convention. The court ruling did not settle the facts. However, it showed how legal moves can amplify proxy claims.
Somalia & Puntland: Ports, Cash, and control
Somalia’s coast sits beside the Gulf of Aden. Emirati-linked moves remain under scrutiny due to the port’s links to piracy, counter-terrorism, and great-power access. A few years ago, the UAE government installed a military-grade radar and air defense batteries in Puntland to monitor its adversaries.
Bosaso: $336m Strategic Deal
In April 2017, Reuters reported Puntland said Dubai’s government-owned P&O Ports won a 30-year deal worth $336 million to expand and manage Bosaso port. A port upgrade can boost trade. However, in a split polity, it can also shift power between federal and regional leaders, which then shapes who controls customs revenue and coast guard forces.
$9.6m Cash Programme Cancelled
In April 2018, Reuters reported Somali security staff seized $9.6 million at Mogadishu airport from a plane arriving from the UAE. Reuters also reported the UAE later disbanded its military training program in Somalia and said the cash was for soldier salaries. Cash can stabilize units fast, yet it also fuels suspicion; therefore, relationships can snap, and trained units can be pulled into new political fights.
Bosaso: The Basing Logic
In March 2025, Reuters reported Somalia’s president offered the United States sole control over key ports and bases, including Bosaso. Even if the offer never becomes policy, it highlights why these ports attract competition: they sit close to key sea lanes and offer logistics depth for crisis response.
Iran: Gateway Trade, Sanctions Risk, Dispute
The UAE’s Iran posture is practical: Dubai stays a trade bridge, yet the same bridge draws sanctions cases when networks route through UAE firms. Reuters reported Iran imported $20.8 billion of goods from the UAE in its fiscal year ending March 2024 and exported $6.6 billion to the UAE in the same period.
These figures explain why the UAE keeps channels open even when tensions rise. GCC statements continue to back UAE claims over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which Iran rejects. The dispute does not stop trade. However, it keeps a sharp edge in the background, which shapes naval planning and messaging.
Balochistan: Loud claims and real motives
Gwadar lies where CPEC meets the Arabian Sea and major shipping lanes. Should it prosper, it has the potential to challenge Dubai’s position as the primary hub for the region. That competition feeds rumors that some outsiders would rather see Gwadar stay unsettled. In Pakistan, some voices accuse UAE-linked networks and India of quietly funding Baloch militants like the BLA. India denies any militancy support, and the veracity of hard public evidence regarding UAE links is still under scrutiny.
Online coverage and talk shows can inflame suspicions, but they do not equal proof. Meanwhile, BLA attacks have hit security forces and Chinese projects, pushing up risk and insurance costs. These strikes also extend project timelines, causing investors to factor delays into every contract. Some analysts see Gwadar and Iran’s Chabahar as rival routes that could dilute Gulf port dominance. At the human level, ordinary people want jobs and stability, not endless proxy games.
Hub Rivalry and Prestige Economics
The UAE has developed a model that relies on its position as the region’s primary interchange. Therefore, it treats corridor control and “stability branding” as core security interests. In parallel, Saudi Arabia has pushed policies meant to pull firms and headquarters into Riyadh, and Reuters has framed the issue as direct competition with Dubai’s hub status. If a rival hub emerges victorious in the routing competition, it will inevitably lead to the movement of money and supply chains. That is why ports, air corridors, and partner forces keep returning to the center of this story.
Post-Sindoor Pakistan–UAE Trust Gap
Many Pakistanis contrast Pakistan’s long record of backing Arab states with the UAE’s recent posture towards India. They point to periods when visa access for Pakistanis tightened, to fewer high-profile Emirati investment moves in Pakistan, and to Abu Dhabi’s careful neutrality during Operation Sindoor.
In this view, the UAE prioritizes commercial calculus—trade, tourism, and strategic partnerships—over older sentiment-based alignments. Supporters of the UAE reply that states pursue interests, not friendships, and that Pakistan must compete for capital through reforms and stability. That gap still shapes trust in crises, public opinion, and future security cooperation across the Gulf and wider region.
Libya: Airpower Backing for Haftar’s LNA
UN investigators and Reuters said Emirati support strengthened the LNA’s air power despite the UN embargo. They cited aircraft-related help, from equipment to sustainment. Later UN monitors noted Chinese-made Wing Loong drones and matching munitions used around Tripoli. The report said the strikes likely came from Haftar’s camp or an aligned third party. The finding matters because it shows modern proxy warfare: remote strike power can move front lines fast.
It also reduces the need for a large foreign ground presence. Analysts warn, though, that civilian harm brings reputational damage and political blowback. Human Rights Watch linked a deadly strike near Tripoli to drones reportedly operated with Emirati support. A clear way to frame it: the UAE was widely reported as Haftar’s top backer, using airpower and logistics. On the ground, Libyan families suffer as outsiders transform the conflict into a controlled experiment.
Ethiopia: External Backing Claims, Key Caveats
Al Jazeera reported an “air bridge” narrative, alleging the UAE provided military support to Addis Ababa during the Tigray war (based on satellite imagery and flight patterns). While satellite images showed some UAE-related military activity, there wasn’t much public evidence at the time to prove that those drones were actually used in attacks.
Separately, a German SWP policy brief describes the UAE’s long-running engagement in Ethiopia and links it to port-access politics (including Berbera), which directly affects Ethiopia’s internal economic and security strategy. Why it matters: Even when the “proxy” is a government, external air systems, intelligence, or logistics can alter internal conflict dynamics. The key is to write the story as reported and debated, not as settled fact.
Tunisia: Meddling Claims, Mixed Evidence
In Tunisia, the UAE is often painted as a quiet player: not announcing moves, but nudging the board. Critics say Emirati money, media ties, or security relationships have favored certain actors and helped marginalize others, especially when Tunisian politics turned volatile.
However, the documentation is inconsistent. Many stories rely on anonymous sourcing, overlapping Gulf rivalries, and correlations that do not prove direction or intent. Tunisia’s own economic squeeze, party fragmentation, and public fatigue also drive decisions from within. The fairest reading is cautious: influence is plausible, but each claim needs hard evidence, not vibes. Always separate suspicion from proof.
UAE–Israel Arms Link
Since the Abraham Accords, UAE–Israel security ties have shifted from back-channel coordination to defense-industrial cooperation, sometimes with limited transparency. Reuters reported Israel agreed to sell an advanced air defense system to the UAE, and Israeli defense exports to new Arab partners rose sharply after normalization.
In 2025, Elbit Systems announced a $2.3 billion eight-year international contract without naming the customer; later reporting linked the mystery buyer to the UAE. These agreements, along with investments and joint projects, can help integrate Israeli technology, such as sensors and counter-UAS tools, into Gulf forces, increasing Israel’s influence in air and sea operations through support, upgrades, and cooperation.
Conclusion: Clear Mechanisms, Disciplined Claims
The UAE doesn’t need to occupy capitals to shape outcomes. That’s messy, expensive, and undesirable for the brochure. Instead, the UAE employs clean levers such as corridors, ports, contracts, and “partner forces” that consistently appear in strategic locations on the map. It’s a classic scenario of a smiling investor by day and a regional chess player by night.
Yemen? Late-2025 reporting points to a rare public rupture around Mukalla and southern politics. Sudan? Reuters and Amnesty have raised resupply allegations linked to the RSF and highlighted specific weapon systems—while Abu Dhabi denies arming anyone, naturally. Somalia? Reuters demonstrates that port deals and security programs can consistently spark sovereignty disputes and policy disruptions.
So yes, the playbook and toolkit are real. The debate centers on whether these actions represent a strategic approach, opportunistic behavior, or simply an unintended consequence of our influence. The defense rule is to treat verified reporting as fact, clearly label allegations, and continuously monitor the supply routes, as the truth often finds its way into the narrative.
References
- https://www.dawn.com/news/1964103
- https://www.reuters.com/world/uae-flights-flood-airstrip-un-says-supplies-weapons-sudan-rebels-2024-12-12/
- https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/sudan-advanced-chinese-weaponry-provided-by-uae-identified-in-breach-of-arms-embargo-new-investigation/
- https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/07/timeline-uaes-role-in-southern-yemens-secret-prisons/
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