Kursk Oblast
Russia’s military says it has pushed Ukrainian troops out of Kursk Oblast, a border zone turned flashpoint. Valery Gerasimov informed President Putin on April 26, 2025, that they had recaptured Gornal, the last town under Ukrainian control.
This meant no Ukrainian troops remained on Russian soil, according to Moscow’s official report. Russia said the operation reversed Ukraine’s surprise invasion that began in August 2024.
Gerasimov claimed over 76,000 Ukrainian soldiers died during the fighting. President Putin called the result a “strategic turning point” that would help Russia advance elsewhere.
But the battle’s real significance went beyond official statements. It revealed shifts in military tactics, battlefield technology, and the broader security landscape.
Putin was taken aback when Ukrainian forces unexpectedly invaded Kursk Oblast nine months ago. Ukraine’s troops moved fast and struck with surprise, taking several settlements, including Sudzha.
Striking Kursk
This was a sharp shift from Ukraine’s usual defensive posture. Ukraine wanted to disrupt Russian operations and pull forces away from Donbas.
Striking Kursk also exposed weaknesses in Russia’s border defenses. Ukraine aimed to gain leverage at the negotiating table as global pressure for a ceasefire grew.
Early April 2025 posts on X talked about how Ukraine was still attacking Russian positions in Kursk with drones. The attacks were aimed at various targets, ranging from air defense systems like the S-400 to drone launch facilities, suggesting that Kyiv was still trying to maintain its advantage up until recently.
Gerasimov explained that Russia’s response was a long-lasting counteroffensive that slowly erased Ukraine’s gains and ended with the capture of Gornal.
Russia was able to take back Kursk with a mix of traditional weapons and new technologies, with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) playing a key role. The Russian military is using drones more and more in its operations. This change was clear in Kursk.
Krasukha-4
Fiber-optic-guided drones, impervious to electronic jamming, made a major breakthrough. Ukraine has used this strategy well throughout the war. These drones, which often had high-resolution cameras and accurate weapons, let Russian forces do reconnaissance and attacks in real time with very little risk to people.
Fiber-optic systems are different from traditional radio-controlled drones because they stay physically connected to the operator. This ensures that they remain unaffected by signal disruption. Although this technology is not entirely new, Russia has swiftly embraced it.
Reports say that parts supplied by North Korea may have sped up production. Russia’s use of electronic warfare systems, such as the Krasukha-4, enhanced the effectiveness of the drones by disrupting Ukrainian communications and drone operations, which made it more difficult for Kyiv to coordinate its forces.
S-400 Triumph system
Drone attacks on the S-400 Triumph system for air defense in Kursk show how important technology is in this conflict. The S-400 is a long-range surface-to-air missile system made by Almaz-Antey in Russia. It can hit aeroplanes, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles up to 400 kilometres away.
Its 48N6E3 missiles can reach speeds of Mach 14, and its phased-array radar can simultaneously monitor up to 100 targets. The S-400, which costs about $500 million per battalion, is a key part of Russia’s air defense network and is often compared to the U.S. Patriot system.
On the other hand, its flaws were shown in Kursk, where Ukrainian drones, most likely FPV models, hit S-400 hangars, as reported on X on April 22, 2025.
These cheap drones, which often carry small explosives, have become a symbol of Ukraine’s asymmetric warfare, going up against high-value weapons like the S-400.
The difference between how complex the S-400 is and how simple the drones are shows a bigger trend: cost-effective systems can now beat platforms that cost millions of dollars.
Starlink Satellite
It was clear early on in the Kursk operation that Ukraine had a lot of technological know-how. Kyiv’s forces relied on Western-made tools like HIMARS rocket systems and Starlink satellite communications to launch quick, well-coordinated attacks.
Lockheed Martin’s HIMARS is a truck-mounted multiple-launch rocket system capable of firing GPS-guided missiles up to 80 kilometers away.
It was perfect for Ukraine’s hit-and-run strategy in Kursk because it was quick and mobile, letting small groups attack Russian positions and then run away before they were attacked again.
SpaceX ran Starlink, which provided safe, high-speed internet access that made it possible to coordinate in real time on the battlefield.
But Ukraine’s technological edge started to fade as Russian forces changed, deploying electronic warfare systems and increasing their troop numbers.
Gerasimov’s claim that Ukraine had to keep adding to its 60,000-strong force in Kursk suggests that Kyiv had a difficult time keeping up its initial momentum, most likely because of overstretched logistics and mounting losses.
Propaganda
People still disagree about how many people died in the Kursk campaign. Gerasimov’s claim of 76,000 Ukrainians killed or hurt in battle remains unverified and aligns with Russia’s tendency to exaggerate enemy casualties for propaganda purposes.
A think tank in Washington, D.C., called the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has warned against taking these numbers at face value, pointing out that both sides lie about casualties to change the story.
Officials from Ukraine haven’t said anything about how many soldiers they lost in Kursk, but the intensity of the fighting and Russia’s superior artillery and air power suggest that many people died.
For background, the ISW estimated in late 2024 that more than 200,000 Ukrainian soldiers had died in the war, and that number probably went up in Kursk.
Gerasimov didn’t say how much Russia had lost, but it’s thought to be a lot since reserves had to be moved from other fronts, as reported by the ISW.
U.S. and South Korean intelligence confirmed in October 2024 that North Korean troops were involved. This makes things even more complicated and makes people wonder how much Russia depends on help from other countries.
Nazi Germany
For history buffs, Kursk Oblast is important because it was the site of the biggest tank battle in World War II. The 1943 Battle of Kursk was a turning point for the Soviet Union’s fight against Nazi Germany. Russia is using this event to boost morale at home by comparing the current victory to the 1943 battle.
Putin’s language, which includes calling Ukraine’s operation a “failed adventure” and using “neo-Nazi” stereotypes, is meant to win support at home while avoiding criticism of Russia’s first defensive mistakes.
Taking back Kursk is also important from a strategic perspective because it protects Russia’s western border and frees up troops for offensives in Donbas, where Russian troops have made small gains around Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar.
But the operation showed that Russia’s border defenses had weak spots, especially because they relied on conscripts and old fortifications, which Ukraine used to its advantage in the first invasion.
There are many bigger effects of the Kursk campaign. With this operation, Ukraine took a significant risk, yielding mixed results. It indicated that Kyiv could project power onto Russian soil, but losing its foothold could hurt morale and make it harder for the West to support it.
In its last few months, the Biden administration has been under more and more pressure to cut back on aid to Ukraine. This is because President-elect Trump wants to settle the conflict through talks. Trump’s repeated calls for an immediate end to the fighting have made people in Kyiv worry that U.S. support might fade.
Donbas
European allies, especially Germany and France, have promised to fill in any gaps, but it’s still not clear how much they can help Ukraine’s war effort.
The loss at Kursk could give people who are against Ukraine’s strategy more confidence. These people say that offensive operations take resources away from important defensive lines in Donbas.
The victory at Kursk makes Putin’s position stronger in Russia and at the negotiating table. Moscow insists that holding territory is essential for peace talks, and retaking Kursk supports that claim.
However, relying on North Korean troops—around 12,000, according to U.S. intelligence—has drawn international criticism. This move has strained Russia’s global image and complicated its relationships with key partners. China, Russia’s major economic ally, has openly distanced itself from the deployment.
In November 2024, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian opposed any “external interference” in the conflict. Using North Korean soldiers also highlights Russia’s deepening manpower shortages. Heavy casualties have only worsened the strain on Russia’s military workforce.
Modern warfare
The ISW says that Russia has lost more than 600,000 people since February 2022. This figure encompasses individuals who have perished, sustained injuries, or disappeared.
Lessons learned about technology at Kursk are likely to find application beyond the battlefield. Modern warfare increasingly relies on drones for both reconnaissance and attacks.
Russia’s fiber-optic drones, while effective, are not the only ones under development. The US, China, and Israel are also working on similar systems.
The U.S. Army’s Switchblade 600 is a loitering bomb with a range of 40 kilometres. It is similar to Ukraine’s FPV drones, but it costs more and is harder to use.
Both sides use China’s DJI Mavic drones, which have emerged as the preferred tool for affordable aerial surveillance. The widespread use of these drones raises questions about the future of conventional forces such as tanks and air defense systems. Small, swift drones are proving to be serious threats to older, expensive military platforms.
In geopolitical terms, the Kursk outcome could shift the war’s direction. Russia’s success in reclaiming territory might encourage Putin to increase attacks in Donbas or pressure Ukraine diplomatically. However, the cost of victory may limit Russia’s ability to keep up its operations.
Heavy losses in troops and equipment could slow Moscow’s next moves. Meanwhile, Ukraine faces the challenge of regrouping after this strategic setback. It must also keep Western military and financial support flowing during this critical time.
Conclusion
The Kursk campaign shows how unstable the situation is, and there is no clear way to end the war. The balance of power is constantly changing because both sides are using new technologies and strategies. Every victory also introduces fresh challenges that require resolution.
It’s scary to see how the Russia-Ukraine war is changing because of the battle for Kursk Oblast. Russia’s retaking of territory marks a tactical win, but it doesn’t guarantee long-term control. Although Ukraine’s bold invasion failed, it exposed Russian vulnerabilities and showed Kyiv’s resilience.
In Kursk, drones, electronic warfare, and regular troops worked together, highlighting the rapid evolution of modern warfare. New battlefield ideas are emerging faster than rules can keep up.
As fighting continues, the big question remains: can either side truly break the deadlock? Or will the war grind into a long, bloody stalemate shaped by mounting casualties and foreign pressure? Future moves on this shifting battlefield may reveal the war’s eventual path.
References
- ISW – Institute for the Study of War
🔗 https://tinyurl.com/ISW-Ukraine - Defense News Today
🔗 https://tinyurl.com/DefenseNews-Today - Reuters – Ukraine Conflict Coverage
🔗 https://tinyurl.com/Reuters-Ukraine - BBC – Ukraine Crisis
🔗 https://tinyurl.com/BBC-Ukraine-News - Al Jazeera – Russia-Ukraine War
🔗 https://tinyurl.com/AlJazeera-Ukraine - SpaceX – Starlink Info
🔗 https://tinyurl.com/Starlink-SpaceX - Lockheed Martin – HIMARS Overview
🔗 https://tinyurl.com/HIMARS-LM - Military Today – S-400 Profile
🔗 https://tinyurl.com/S400-Profile - War on the Rocks—Drone Warfare
🔗 https://tinyurl.com/Drone-Wars-WOTR - X (Twitter)—Ukraine War Updates
🔗 https://tinyurl.com/UkraineWar-X
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